Trade is very central to Trump’s world view: Navtej Sarna

How seriously should we take US President Donald Trump as he makes these claims? Is it posturing or something more?

It is difficult to say that you don’t take seriously the most powerful man in the world. You have to factor in Mr. Trump’s unpredictable personality, his history of making surprising statements, his desire to be at the centre of everything, his claims that he is the greatest deal maker and aspirations to be the great peacemaker. So much of it is allowed to go unchallenged, but slowly there is pushback as we’ve seen from statements by our Foreign Office spokesperson and External Affairs Minister. You can’t ignore these statements by Trump completely because you have to put your position down. You also cannot challenge these positions because he’s the most important man. It’s not an easy googly to play, but that’s where we are.

So, it is a bit of a tightrope walk?

Yes, I think it is a tightrope walk—not on substance but in tactics.

India has invested a lot in the relationship with the US across successive Prime Ministers. Given Mr. Trump’s personality, is this investment misplaced?

The distinction is that we’ve made investments in the relationship, not in one President alone. The India-US relationship has been steadily growing since President [Bill] Clinton’s time. After the watershed moment of our 1998 nuclear tests, it’s been a steadily rising graph. It’s not been 100 per cent on every count, but overall, the relationship has been strengthening, widening, and deepening. It is our most important relationship, crucial for India’s development as a major economy, a technological power, and for our security.

In Trump’s first term, we made gains on the strategic and defence side–signing foundational agreements, attaining the Strategic Trade Authorisation tier 1 status, becoming part of the Indo-Pacific policy, reviving the Quad. We did well on strategic and security terms, though not so well on trade. I don’t think we should question our fundamental strategic partnership with the US.

Regarding the current situation, telephone calls were obviously made by American officials to Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and New Delhi. American involvement in the region is not new. For our viewers, can you explain the distinction between having contacts, making suggestions, and that word we do not like: mediation?

It’s an important distinction. When there’s a crisis situation anywhere, telephones are a normal means of communicating your narrative to partners and even fence-sitters. Our Foreign Minister made several calls at different stages. That doesn’t mean you’re seeking mediation on fundamental issues. Whatever scenarios led to the Pakistani Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) calling our DGMO, this was just a cessation of hostilities. This is not mediation in the sense of a third country mediating like US-Iran talks. Some countries claiming credit for making a few phone calls is different from mediation, which is when a country says, “I’m going to help you resolve this problem.”

Some of Trump’s statements suggest that approach, like when he said in 2019 something along the lines of, “If you guys want, I can resolve this.” He sometimes, perhaps, sees this as another real estate arbitration he can handle. This is not mediation in the sense of a third country mediating, like US-Iran talks. There are voices in the US telling President Trump to stay away from trying to resolve disputes between India and Pakistan. In this case, we must push back that mediation doesn’t happen like this. As far as we’re concerned, the Pakistanis called and we accepted. No country, certainly not India, accepts a ceasefire unless it serves its interests at that particular moment.

Moving to trade: Trump has repeatedly said he has used trade as a threat but wants to enhance trade with India and Pakistan, signalling that a deal is about to be made. Is he trying to push India into a deal more favourable to the US?

Trade is very central to Trump’s world view. He’s already said India has agreed to zero tariffs on everything, which I don’t see happening. He has a very basic idea of trade: how much do you export to me, how much do I export, trade balance, tariffs–irrespective of whether that trade imbalance may actually be helping the US. He will use all sorts of carrots and sticks to get a good trade deal. It’s up to us to see where we draw these lines.

With China, he imposed massive tariffs, then claimed he struck a good deal after talks in Switzerland. Is there something for us to learn from that? Can standing up to Trump be helpful?

We’re not in the same situation as China. There’s been a feeling that Trump really wants to make a deal with China–not permanent competition, but a “big boys club”. He admires Xi [Jinping] and [Vladimir] Putin, and seems to be looking at deals where they can have their zones of influence. We must be firm where necessary. Some concessions may actually help increase our own competitiveness. India has a long history, particularly in trade negotiations, of being very firm. A certain amount of firmness helps because he’s not going to give us credit for being very soft.

Are his statements about taking credit for resolving this cessation of hostilities as much about trade as his administration’s role?

He likes to announce victories, and he hasn’t had many regarding the Middle East or Ukraine. He likes to announce big deals. Nobody said this was going to be a peaceful administration. The phrase was used early on: “Make sure your seat belts are on.”

From your time in Washington, DC, what did you understand about Trump that might be useful, given we have to deal with him for another three and a half years? How does India manage this relationship?

Our foreign policy establishment has had the experience of Trump 1.0 and knows how to manage his unpredictability. One shouldn’t set too much store with a relationship with only one part of the US administration or one person because he is essentially unpredictable and transactional.

He can be very warm one day and call you “Tariff King” the same day. We have to build constituencies across the US—in Congress, media, universities, and importantly, industry. It’s a multi-vector approach while making sure we keep getting our story back to him. We need to look for and build champions of the relationship within the administration. During Trump 1.0, we had supporters who stabilised things when they got rocky. This is not a typical or predictable administration and, which we must keep that in mind.

Post-Kargil, India’s decision to confine itself to the affected area won us friends. In 2008, many options were on the table but were not exercised, winning international support. This time, delegations going abroad suggest India needs to press its case more. The hyphen that everyone spoke about seems diluted—Pakistan is gaining confidence in projecting its view. Is it really so easy to isolate a country like Pakistan?

It’s not isolation for isolation’s sake. What has worked broadly is recognition worldwide that Pakistan backs cross-border terrorism. When you mention names like Omar Saeed Sheikh or Daniel Pearl, or that Osama Bin Laden was harboured by Pakistan, it makes sense in New York and Washington, [DC]. The linkage of terrorism with Pakistan is well recognised, but must be kept centre stage to explain India’s actions.

When Pakistan says “let’s have an inquiry” or tries to internationalise an issue, it sounds reasonable at a superficial level. The world says, “these are both nuclear countries”, and loses that connection to terrorism, creating a certain hyphenation. But this hyphenation isn’t like 20-30 years ago because India is far more important to the world economically and geopolitically. If countries want an important relationship with India, they can’t keep equating us with Pakistan. Nevertheless, hyphenation happens at a superficial level, which is Pakistan’s intention by flashing the nuclear card.

And they seem to have done it again, with the alarm bells that went off.

The only one talking of nuclear alarm bells was President Trump. Everyone has seen how India has played its role as a nuclear weapons state.

Is the diplomatic toolkit needed during a non-military response different from that during a military response?

Yes, the ground situation becomes different. India has decided that enough is enough with terrorism from Pakistan. The government has made it clear there is a new normal.

How does the US cope with this new normal, given terrorists still operate in Jammu and Kashmir? If something else happens, how will Washington respond?

I’m more concerned about how India should respond. , which will be particularly strong. There is clarity is there that if there’s a terror attack propagated by Pakistan, we will equate Pakistan and terrorists—it will be seen virtually as an act of war. This message should be backed by international support in organisations like the FATF [Financial Action Task Force], because terrorism needs an ecosystem. Pakistan has to be called to task in different places. They didn’t do well in the UN [United Nations] Security Council this time because the world knows the reality. A broad consensus must be built on Pakistan as a supporter of terrorism. I don’t think anybody is objecting to India’s reaction because every country knows that to protect their citizens, they have to take action.